In Kauffman Racing Equipment, LLC v. Roberts, 2010-Ohio-2251 [PDF], the Court examined whether Ohio had personal jurisdiction over an alleged defamer who made internet postings from his home in Virginia.
Personal jurisdiction, of course, is a two-part analysis. A court first must examine whether the Ohio long-arm statute and Civil Rule regarding service, R.C. 2307.382 and Rule 4.3, respectively, permit the exercise of jurisdiction. Analogizing to the technology of yesteryear–letter writing–the Court explained the allegedly defamatory statemetns were “published” in Ohio by virtue of their actual receipt by several individuals in Ohio. That fact brings the case within R.C. 2307.382(A)(3) and Rule 4.3(A)(3), which confer jurisdiction over allegedly tortious acts committed in Ohio.
This, of course, is something of a legal fiction, as the postings were certainly not created within Ohio. As a fall-back position, the Court cites R.C. 2307.382(A)(9) and Rule 4.3(A)(6), which create jurisdiction over allegedly tortious acts committed outside Ohio where the alleged tortfeasor might reasonably expect that someone in Ohio would be injured by the acts. The Court’s fall-back seems to be the stronger position and probably should have been the primary holding. It will be interesting to see whether the Court’s holding that the publication actually occurred in Ohio by virtue of its receipt in Ohio has any unexpected consequences in the future. (Though to be fair, this is simply an extension of existing precedent, not new doctrine, so perhaps the concern is misplaced.)
Having established that the long-arm statute and Civil Rule are satisfied, the second part of the personal-jurisdiction analysis comes under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As relevant here, due process requires that the exercise of jurisdiction arise out of the defendant’s contacts with Ohio. The defendant must have purposely availed itself of the privilege of acting in Ohio, and must have reasonably anticipated that it may be haled into court in Ohio; the defendant’s contacts with Ohio must not be random, fortuitous, or attenuated.
Employing the well-known Calder “effects test,” the Court held that the defendant’s allegedly tortious conduct was not simply “untargeted negligence,” but rather purposeful activity directed at a resident of Ohio. The defendant therefore should have assumed that the effects of his actions should be felt in Ohio, and as a result he could reasonably anticipate being haled into court in Ohio.
Kauffman is not a landmark decision. It is well-supported by existing law on both personal jurisdiction and defamation. But it is another example of courts’ willingness to engage with technology and to fit current doctrine into the new world order. Let’s hope that Ohio continues down its path of reasonableness in this regard.
As a side note, Kauffman is now officially my favorite opinion of 2010, thanks to the explanatory parenthetical in ¶13 of “(emoticons omitted).”
This post was written by Jeffrey M. Nye.
