This time it was the Ohio Supreme Court, holding that orders granting or denying a stay of a court proceeding pending the outcome of arbitration are immediately appealable, even where the trial court does not include Civ.R. 54(B) language in its entry.  The case is Mynes v. Brooks, 2009-Ohio-5946 [PDF].

Civ.R. 54(B) provides that  where an order disposes of less than all of the claims or defenses in a case, a trial court may make it immediately appealable if it finds that there is “no just reason for delay”; absent such a finding, an order which disposes of less than all of the claims or defenses is appealable only upon final adjudication of the entire case.

At issue in Mynes was the provision in R.C. 2711.02(C), which provides that

“[A]n order . . . that grants or denies a stay of a trial of any action pending arbitration . . . is a final order and may be reviewed, affirmed, modified, or reversed on appeal pursuant to the Rules of Appellate Procedure and, to the extent not in conflict with those rules, Chapter 2505. of the Revised Code.”

The Court ruled that this provision demonstrates that “the General Assembly has already determined that orders under the ambit of R.C. 2711.02(C) are final and appealable. Therefore, there is no need for the trial court to determine whether to certify the order for appeal.”

The Court also likened the case to its ruling in Sullivan v. Anderson Township, 2009-Ohio-1971 [PDF], in which the Court held that an order denying immunity to a political subdivision is a final order and therefore immediately appealable under comparable languate in R.C. 2744.02(C).

Two former law partners agreed to arbitrate a dispute regarding the dissolution of their firm.  The arbitrator rendered an award, and one of the partners filed a motion to vacate pursuant to R.C. 2711.13, which places a ninety-day limit on such motions.  Shortly after filing, the motion to vacate was voluntarily dismissed, purportedly pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A).  Just less than one year later, the motion to vacate the award was re-filed, this time purportedly pursuant to the savings statute, R.C. 2305.19(A).

The court rejected the motion to vacate as untimely, holding that Rule 41(A) and the savings statute do not apply to “special proceedings” such as arbitrations:

Although long ago abolishing the distinction between suits in law and in equity (as recognized in Civ.R. 2), Ohio still recognizes a category of “special statutory proceedings” that is somewhat different from ordinary civil cases.

These special statutory proceedings are reflected in Civ.R. 1(C):

These rules, to the extent that they would by their nature be clearly inapplicable, shall not apply to procedure . . . in all . . . special statutory proceedings.

Confirmation or vacation of an arbitration award are two such special statutory proceedings to which Rule 41(A) does not apply.  Because Rule 41(A) doesn’t apply, neither does the savings statute.  “Were the law otherwise,” the court explained, “the three-month limitation period would be meaningless and could be extended to 15 months or more, undermining the expediency promised by arbitration.”

The take-away: courts mean it when they say that the law favors arbitration because it leads to more expeditious resolutions of disputes than the public court system.  The arbitration statutes create some unique rights and obligations.  Be aware of them, and enforce them promptly.

The case is Greenwald v. Shayne, 2009-Ohio-3384.