Procedure

A Business Practice Tip - Embezzling: Spotting and Preventing

Thursday, September 15th, 2011

A Business Practice Tip – Embezzling: Spotting and Preventing

Compliments of SlawTips: http://tips.slaw.ca/

As the economy remains depressed, most who still have a job feel fortunate, however, lack of economic growth usually translates into steady or even declining compensation – often in the face of demands for greater productivity.  Hard times like these, in turn, sometimes motivate workers, from the lowest paid to the highest, to seek to supplement their income through skimming profits from their employer  How do you spot a person who is likely to engage in dishonesty within the firm, and how do you prevent it?


Securing Debt and Protecting Your Company’s Bottom Line

Wednesday, March 23rd, 2011

In the shifting sands of today’s dynamic and downward economy, the prospect of extending credit requires more demanding evaluation and consideration than ever before.  Our suggestion to clients is to do a little of what we have done, step back and ask yourself: 1) Who am I lending money to or extending credit to; and 2) How do I structure this credit relationship to make sure I am taking as few risks of non-payment as possible?  Answering these questions appropriately and with sound legal reasoning will help impact the bottom line in the long run.

The first point to consider is front-end credit evaluation.  Take time and the opportunity to evaluate your current credit review policies and (if applicable) vendors.  Is the information you are receiving current and reliable?  Have you noticed any failures or loopholes in the process that have resulted in credit losses?  It goes without saying that taking the necessary steps up front to evaluate credit risk is a major factor in the long term health of receivables, aging, and profitability.

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Buy-Sell Agreements Serve Important Purpose

Wednesday, March 23rd, 2011

Arguably, all small businesses with more than one owner should have buy-sell agreements regardless of whether they are organized as a corporation, limited liability company, or partnership.  The purpose and functions remain the same though the form and structure may vary.  

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Everyone Gets Organized at Some Point, They Just Might Not Be Around for It

Wednesday, March 23rd, 2011

Many people do not like to think about death (understandably), and so they avoid thinking about what will happen to everything they have accumulated during their lifetimes after they have died. 

The most common refrain I hear is, “I don’t have much; everything will just go to my family.”  Even though that might be the case, do you know how it will actually get to your family?  Without any planning, the most likely case will be that one of your family members will be required to apply to the Probate Court for the authority to work with the financial institutions where your assets are held.  Yes, Probate Court.

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When was the last time you read Rule 41(A)(1)?

Tuesday, June 15th, 2010

The Ohio Supreme Court issued a brief decision last week in Morgan Stanley Dean Witter v. Sutula, 2010-Ohio-2468 [PDF] which I initially overlooked. The decision reverses the Eighth District’s grant of a writ of prohibition, but there’s an interesting nugget in here that affects all litigators.

That nugget is the parsing of Rule 41(A). The Court notes that “Civ.R. 41(A)[1] allows for a dismissal of all claims against particular defendants, and not individual claims.” In other words, a party cannot utilize Rule 41(A)(1) to dismiss part of its claim — the text of the rule actually states that 41(A)(1) is all or nothing.

There are certainly other attorneys who have had a few more trips around the block than yours truly, but in my two years as a law clerk and one year in practice, I have never seen this distinction made by a practicing attorney. It is absolutely standard procedure to dismiss some but not all claims via a Rule 41(A)(1) notice of dismissal.

Instead, it appears, if a party wants to dismiss only some of its claim, it must obtain an order of the court under Rule 41(A)(2). That rule provides that, “[e]xcept as provided in division (A)(1) of this rule, a claim shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff’s insistence except upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper.” In other words, the partial dismissal must come from the court, not the plaintiff, and a court can place conditions upon a partial dismissal.

I could be wrong, but this seems like an awfully important distinction, no? Think about it — how many partial dismissals have you filed in the last year? As it turns out, all of those claims are still pending. Or better yet, how many partial dismissals of claims against your client have been filed? You might have to defend those yet.


Ohio Supreme Court: yes to personal jurisdiction over out-of-state internet defamation

Friday, June 11th, 2010

In Kauffman Racing Equipment, LLC v. Roberts, 2010-Ohio-2251 [PDF], the Court examined whether Ohio had personal jurisdiction over an alleged defamer who made internet postings from his home in Virginia.

Personal jurisdiction, of course, is a two-part analysis. A court first must examine whether the Ohio long-arm statute and Civil Rule regarding service, R.C. 2307.382 and Rule 4.3, respectively, permit the exercise of jurisdiction. Analogizing to the technology of yesteryear–letter writing–the Court explained the allegedly defamatory statemetns were “published” in Ohio by virtue of their actual receipt by several individuals in Ohio. That fact brings the case within R.C. 2307.382(A)(3) and Rule 4.3(A)(3), which confer jurisdiction over allegedly tortious acts committed in Ohio.

This, of course, is something of a legal fiction, as the postings were certainly not created within Ohio. As a fall-back position, the Court cites R.C. 2307.382(A)(9) and Rule 4.3(A)(6), which create jurisdiction over allegedly tortious acts committed outside Ohio where the alleged tortfeasor might reasonably expect that someone in Ohio would be injured by the acts. The Court’s fall-back seems to be the stronger position and probably should have been the primary holding. It will be interesting to see whether the Court’s holding that the publication actually occurred in Ohio by virtue of its receipt in Ohio has any unexpected consequences in the future. (Though to be fair, this is simply an extension of existing precedent, not new doctrine, so perhaps the concern is misplaced.)

Having established that the long-arm statute and Civil Rule are satisfied, the second part of the personal-jurisdiction analysis comes under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As relevant here, due process requires that the exercise of jurisdiction arise out of the defendant’s contacts with Ohio. The defendant must have purposely availed itself of the privilege of acting in Ohio, and must have reasonably anticipated that it may be haled into court in Ohio; the defendant’s contacts with Ohio must not be random, fortuitous, or attenuated.

Employing the well-known Calder “effects test,” the Court held that the defendant’s allegedly tortious conduct was not simply “untargeted negligence,” but rather purposeful activity directed at a resident of Ohio. The defendant therefore should have assumed that the effects of his actions should be felt in Ohio, and as a result he could reasonably anticipate being haled into court in Ohio.

Kauffman is not a landmark decision. It is well-supported by existing law on both personal jurisdiction and defamation. But it is another example of courts’ willingness to engage with technology and to fit current doctrine into the new world order. Let’s hope that Ohio continues down its path of reasonableness in this regard.

As a side note, Kauffman is now officially my favorite opinion of 2010, thanks to the explanatory parenthetical in ¶13 of “(emoticons omitted).”


Ohio Supreme Court invalidates part of sex offender reclassification

Thursday, June 3rd, 2010

Two weeks ago we wrote that the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Clayborn may be a preview as to the Court’s willingness to strike down the Adam Walsh Act on ex post facto grounds.


First District upholds contempt sanctions for violation of non-compete agreement

Thursday, May 6th, 2010

In yesterday’s decision in Mitchell’s Salon & Day Spa v. Bustle, 2010-Ohio-1880 [PDF], the First District affirmed a trial court’s imposition of sanctions for violation of a non-compete clause and a court order which essentially incorporated that non-compete. Interstingly, a majority of the panel approved both a disgorgement of profits and an extension of the non-compete term.

When Michael Bustle started working as a hairstylist at Michael’s in 1995, he signed an agreement which included a one-year non-compete clause. He left in August 2007 and rented a booth at a competing salon. Michaels sued Bustle several months later, after noticing that his clients did not return. The parties agreed to a settlement under which Bustle would not provide any hair styling or hair care treatment for one year — that is, Bustle essentially agreed to abide by his non-compete clause — and the trial court journalized an entry incorporating their agreement.

After Bustle’s customers still did not return, Michaels hired a private investigator to determine whether Bustle was violating the court’s order. After a seven-month investigation the PI determined that Bustle was still providing the prohibited services, and Michaels filed a motion for contempt.

At the contempt hearing, Bustle admitted to providing prohibited services to 180 former Michaels clients and had profited over $37,000 in nine months of doing so. Testimony from Michaels revealted that its lost profits for the same work would have been about twice as much, and that it had incurred about $15,000 in attorney’s fees and about $52,000 in PI fees. The trial court found Bustle in contempt, awarded damages and costs totaling about $140,000 to Michaels, and enjoined Bustle from competing for an additional 11 months.

On appeal, the First District rejected Bustle’s arguments that the agreed order did not comply with Rule 65 (because Bustle agreed to it, he had no cause to complain — somewhat similar to invited error, if any error) and that Michaels waited too long to pursue its contempt motion (the court found the time to be reasonable due to the necessary investigation).

On the issue of whether Michaels was awarded a double recovery by virtue of a disgorgement of profits and an extended non-compete term, the court explained that in a contempt case, the court has power to both coerce compliance with the court’s order, and to compensate the the party injured by the contempt. By disgorging the profits and awarding the costs to Michaels in addition to extending the non-compete term, the First District said, the parties were merely put back in the position that they would have been in if there had been no contempt. As a result, there was no double recovery.

Judge Hendon disagreed on the double recovery issue. Because the non-compete period has now expired, however, and cannot be undone, she concurred in the judgment.


First District on Iqbal/Twombly

Friday, April 9th, 2010

We have covered Iqbal and Twombly several times in this space (see here, here, here, and here). Briefly, those decisions impose a “plausibility” standard on allegations in a complaint; if the facts pleaded are not plausible, the complaint is subject to dismissal under Civ.R. 12(b)(6). This is more onerous than the long-standing possibility or conceivability standard.

Earlier this week the First District cited Iqbal and Twombly [PDF] for what appears to be the first time, putting it in line with the Eighth and Ninth Districts as Ohio appellate courts which have adopted the heightened standard. To be sure, Ohio courts have consistently looked to federal case law for guidance in the interpretation of analogous rules, but Iqbal and Twombly were enough of a game changer to lead some to speculate that Ohio courts may demurr and retain the old standard.


Supreme Court: Expert testimony regarding trademark registration not sufficient to prove registration

Thursday, February 11th, 2010

In State v. Triosi, 2010-Ohio-275 [PDF], the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the vacation of a conviction for trademark counterfeiting because the prosecution failed to establish that the trademarks allegedly being counterfeited were registered with the US Patent and Trademark Office, as required by R.C. 2913.34(A)(4).

Instead, the prosecution witness — a police officer who was also “trained by several purse and jewelry companies to recognize their trademarks and to recognize counterfeit products” — merely testified that in his opinion the items seized were counterfeit. He also testified that through his “training and experience” he was aware that the trademarks were on the principal register of the USPTO, but he admitted that he had never seen any registration documents. A five-member majority of the court held that this testimony was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the marks were on the principal register. Although the majority doesn’t say so, in effect the holding is that the testimony about registration is hearsay–the companies who owned the marks told the officer that they were registered, and the officer told the court. When viewed in that light, it’s classic hearsay under Evid. Rule 801.

And yet, two justices dissented, arguing instead that the victims are most likely to know which marks were counterfeited, and the fact that the officer was trained by victims qualifies him as an expert with capacity to testify about the registration.

The dissent’s approach strikes me as somewhat similar to the practice rejected by the Supreme Court of the United States in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts. In that case, the Court held that the prosecution may not introduce a forensic report at trial without making the report’s author available to testify (or to be otherwise cross-examined by the defendant). What the dissent in Triosi would allow is something of the complement to what was rejected in Melendez-Diaz — whereas Melendez-Diaz prohibited admitting the documentation without the foundation testimony of the witness, the Triosi dissent would allow the testimony of the witness without the foundation documents.

(For what it’s worth, there was some sentiment in Sixth Amendment circles that Melendez-Diaz, however young it may be, was not long for the world when Justice Sotomayor joined the Court; she was seen as a possible fifth vote to overturn Melendez-Diaz, and the case of Briscoe v. Virginia — which was already on the Court’s docket for OT09 when Justice Sotomayor took the bench — was seen as a possible vehicle to do so. Briscoe was fully briefed, but on January 25 of this year — just two weeks after argument — the Court issued a one-sentence per curiam decision vacating and remanding in light of Melendez-Diaz.)