In today’s decision in Doane v. Givaudan Flavors Corp. [PDF], the First District held that manufacturers of chemicals used to make butter flavoring were not liable for injuries to the employees of the companies who purchased those chemicals, because the manufacturers adequately warned the purchasing companies of the chemicals’ dangers.  Specifically, the employees used diacetyl and acetaldehyde, and alleged that their exposure to these chemicals caused bronchiolitis obliterans, known colloquially as “popcorn lung.”

The relevant statute is R.C. 2307.76, which provides that a product is defective if the manufacturer knew or should have known about the risk associated with the product, and if the manufacturer failed to provide the warning or instruction that a manufacturer exercising reasonable care would have provided.  The so-called “knowledgeable employer” or “sophistocated user” defense provides that a manufacturer’s duty to warn can be discharged by providing information about the dangers to a third person on whom it can reasonably rely to communicate the warning to the ultimate users of the product.  Whether a manufacturer can reasonably rely on that third person is a fact-specific determination.

The court held that it was reasonable for the manufacturers to rely on the purchasing company here because the purchaser had knowledge about the dangers that was equal to or greater than that of the manufacturer–it had created a task force to study the dangers, and there was some evidence that it had wanted to remain “officially ignorant” of the cause of the disease suffered by its employees.  The purchaser also regulated its employees’ safety requirements, retained professionals in health and occupational safety, and had exclusive control over delivery of the chemicals.

The court additionally affirmed the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment on the employees’ intentional tort claims on statute-of-limitations grounds.

The First District today ruled that while differential diagnosis can be a valid basis for medical causation opinions, “its use is appropriate only when considering potential causes that are scientifically known,” and that “not every opinion that is reached via differential-diagnosis method will meet the standard of reliability required by Daubert” and Valentine [PDF].

The case is Perry v. Biggs.

In a six-page judgment entry today, the First District held that “[t]he open-and-obvious doctrine still applies in Ohio,” and affirmed summary judgment in favor of a homeowner in a slip-and-fall case.  The court explained that the open and obvious nature of a hazard itself serves as a warning, and that a homeowner is therefore under no duty to warn an invitee or a social guest.  There were no attendant circumstances in this case; “the attendant circumstances exception is narrow and does not encompass the common and the ordinary.”

The injured person additionally sued the contractor who built the bookshelves into the stair landing, arguing that they were negligently installed, which narrowed the landing and created a visual distraction for visitors approaching the step.  Although the court agreed that ”[a] contractor is liable to all those who may be foreseeably injured by the dangerous condition of a structure, not only when the contractor fails to disclose known dangerous conditions, but also when the work is negligently done,” the court again explained that if any dangerous condition existed, it was “noticeable,” and the injured person therefore should have been able to discover it.

The case is Adab v. Faradid U.S., Inc. [PDF]