Cincinnati Lawyers Finney, Stagnaro, Saba & Patterson » Personal Injury

Eastside Lawyers CLE: Friday, September 23rd, Settlement Tools and Tips

FSSP — Wed, 24 Aug 2011 14:41:20 +0000

Please Join Us for a CLE Program on September 23rd from 12:00 – 1:30pm -Cost $25 includes CLE & Lunch (OH, IN & KY)

Location: Hyde Park Country Club 3740 Erie Ave. Cincinnati OH 45208

Settlemet Tools and Tips

Presented by: William T. “Tay” Robinson, IV

12:00 – 1:00pm CLE Presentation

1:00 – 1:30pm Lunch – Eat in or carry out

DESCRIPTION: The following topics will be covered during Tay’s presentation:

I. What are types of annuities?

II. What is a Structured Settlement Annuity?

III. Investment Risk vs. Management risk

IV. Juvenile Case Considerations

V. Life Expectancy and Annuity Benefits

VI. What is a Qualified Settlement Fund?

VII. Structured Settlements can Defer Tax on a “taxable” award

RSVP Chrissy Rother crother@fssp-law.com or 513-533-2986

Ohio Supreme Court: employer intentional tort statute is constitutional

Jeffrey M. Nye — Tue, 23 Mar 2010 14:00:36 +0000

In a pair of opinions released today, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the employer intentional tort statute, R.C. 2745.01, does not violate the right to a jury trial or access to courts, the separation-of-powers doctrine, the right to due process of law, or the right to equal protection under the laws. The decisions are perhaps most interesting for their discussion of the legislative history of employer tort law and worker’s comp law, as well as the Court’s general policy statements on the role of the legislative and judicial branches.

In reaching its conclusion that the statute was facially constitutional, the Court relied in part on the statute’s legislative history, explaining that it “embodies the General Assembly’s intent to significantly curtail an employee’s access to common-law damages for what we will call a ‘substantially certain’ employer intentional tort” — but also noted that the statute “does not abolish the tort entirely.”

The Court also reiterated its prior holding that “the legislative branch of government is ‘the ultimate arbiter of public policy’” and that “the legislature is entrusted with the power to continually refine Ohio’s laws to meet the needs of our citizens.” Furthermore, the Court wrote that “[i]t is not the role of the courts to second-guess the General Assembly’s policy choices,” including policy choices which “alter, revise, modify, or abolish the common law.”

As to the merits of the certified questions, the Court rejected the argument that the current version of R.C. 2745.01 was so similar to prior unconstitutional versions that stare decisis must apply to invalidate it. Instead, the current version differs in the required standard of proof and lacks several limitations on damages contained in prior versions.

The cases are Stetter v. R.J. Corman Derailment Services, LLC, 2010-Ohio-1029 [PDF] and Kaminski v. Metal & Wire Products Company, 2010-Ohio-1027 [PDF].

An exception to the assured clear distance statute?

Jeffrey M. Nye — Fri, 02 Oct 2009 13:33:11 +0000

In today’s decision in Mincy v. Farthing, 2009-Ohio-5245 [PDF], the First District held that the assured clear distance statute, R.C. 4511.21, may not apply to a situation where a driver takes evasive action to avoid an obstruction in the road. Specifically, the driver in this case swerved to avoid an overturned car in her lane and collided with the concrete highway divider. The court held that it may be inappropriate to apply the assured clear distance statute because the driver did not actually collide with the overturned car, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Products liability: chemical suppliers can rely on purchaser to warn of danger

Jeffrey M. Nye — Fri, 25 Sep 2009 14:24:57 +0000

In today’s decision in Doane v. Givaudan Flavors Corp. [PDF], the First District held that manufacturers of chemicals used to make butter flavoring were not liable for injuries to the employees of the companies who purchased those chemicals, because the manufacturers adequately warned the purchasing companies of the chemicals’ dangers. Specifically, the employees used diacetyl and acetaldehyde, and alleged that their exposure to these chemicals caused bronchiolitis obliterans, known colloquially as “popcorn lung.”

The relevant statute is R.C. 2307.76, which provides that a product is defective if the manufacturer knew or should have known about the risk associated with the product, and if the manufacturer failed to provide the warning or instruction that a manufacturer exercising reasonable care would have provided. The so-called “knowledgeable employer” or “sophistocated user” defense provides that a manufacturer’s duty to warn can be discharged by providing information about the dangers to a third person on whom it can reasonably rely to communicate the warning to the ultimate users of the product. Whether a manufacturer can reasonably rely on that third person is a fact-specific determination.

The court held that it was reasonable for the manufacturers to rely on the purchasing company here because the purchaser had knowledge about the dangers that was equal to or greater than that of the manufacturer–it had created a task force to study the dangers, and there was some evidence that it had wanted to remain “officially ignorant” of the cause of the disease suffered by its employees. The purchaser also regulated its employees’ safety requirements, retained professionals in health and occupational safety, and had exclusive control over delivery of the chemicals.

The court additionally affirmed the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment on the employees’ intentional tort claims on statute-of-limitations grounds.

Use of differential diagnosis in med mal case

Jeffrey M. Nye — Wed, 16 Sep 2009 14:20:30 +0000

The First District today ruled that while differential diagnosis can be a valid basis for medical causation opinions, “its use is appropriate only when considering potential causes that are scientifically known,” and that “not every opinion that is reached via differential-diagnosis method will meet the standard of reliability required by Daubert” and Valentine [PDF].

The case is Perry v. Biggs.

Open-and-obvious doctrine; contractor liability for negligent work

Jeffrey M. Nye — Wed, 09 Sep 2009 19:00:58 +0000

In a six-page judgment entry today, the First District held that “[t]he open-and-obvious doctrine still applies in Ohio,” and affirmed summary judgment in favor of a homeowner in a slip-and-fall case. The court explained that the open and obvious nature of a hazard itself serves as a warning, and that a homeowner is therefore under no duty to warn an invitee or a social guest. There were no attendant circumstances in this case; “the attendant circumstances exception is narrow and does not encompass the common and the ordinary.”

The injured person additionally sued the contractor who built the bookshelves into the stair landing, arguing that they were negligently installed, which narrowed the landing and created a visual distraction for visitors approaching the step. Although the court agreed that ”[a] contractor is liable to all those who may be foreseeably injured by the dangerous condition of a structure, not only when the contractor fails to disclose known dangerous conditions, but also when the work is negligently done,” the court again explained that if any dangerous condition existed, it was “noticeable,” and the injured person therefore should have been able to discover it.

The case is Adab v. Faradid U.S., Inc. [PDF]

Lang v. Holly Hill Motel, 2009

Jeffrey M. Nye — Wed, 26 Aug 2009 03:09:34 +0000

Lang v. Holly Hill Motel, 2009-Ohio-2495 – violation of Ohio Basic Building Code does not preclude application of open and obvious doctrine

We have previously blogged about the effect of an Ohio Basic Building Code violation in a slip-and-fall case. The Ohio Supreme Court recently weighed in on the issue in Lang, holding that a violation of the OBBC does not create an exception to the no-duty rule for open and obvious dangers. Full opinion is here [PDF].